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Abstract A plethora of ethical issues in livestock agriculture has emerged to
public attention in recent decades, of which environmental and animal welfare
concerns are but two, albeit prominent, themes. For livestock agriculture to be
considered sustainable, somehow these interconnected themes need to be addressed.
Ethical debate on these issues has been extensive, but mostly started from and
focused on single issues. The views of farmers in these debates have been largely
absent, or merely figured as interests, instead of being considered morally worth-
while themselves. In this paper the relevance for ethical debates of the ways farmers
discuss and engage with moral concerns is explored. The variety of norms that
figure in contemporary farming practices is sketched in its multifarious complexity,
illustrated by ethnographic fieldwork, and systematized in terms of ‘‘orders of
worth.’’ Reviewing the practical arguments and commitments of farmers within this
framework reveals that farming practices are subject to mixed motives, in which an
amalgam of types of concerns play a role. Recognition of the peculiarly entangled
nature of the ethics of farming practices could counter the tendency in policy
making, technological innovation, and ethical thought to compartmentalize our
moral landscape. Understanding farming practice as the integration of a mosaic of
concerns in the light of a variety of moral experiences would foster public appre-
ciation of positions of farmers in debates on improving the sustainability and
societal acceptability of livestock agriculture.
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Introduction
Talking ‘‘Ethics’’ with Farmers?
A casual conversation between for instance two dairy farmers might move logically
from the weather forecast, the amount of rain since the ‘‘first cut’’ of grass, the
health status of the cows, to preparations for the possible implications of climate
change. And from interest rates, lending policies of banks, designs for new housing-
systems, to milk prices, microbiological cell-counts, and breeding choices. Farmers
typically do not discuss ethical issues in the way policy makers or professional
ethicists tend to do. For instance ‘‘animal welfare’’ is not a subject likely to be
discussed as such, or that one can easily start a conversation on in these terms.
‘‘Let’s not lose sight of farmer welfare as well, shall we’’ is easily retorted. Does this
mean that farmers do not care about the welfare of their animals, or only consider it
as far as it is part of their productive concerns? Not necessarily, as this paper will
argue. But in what way do ethical issues feature in farming practices and the
discourse of farmers? How can we best understand the ‘‘ethics on the farm,’’ the
moral experience of farmers and their ethical choices? And in what terms could we
engage in conversations with farmers on societal concerns situated on their farms?
A Mosaic of Concerns
Livestock farms have become the sites of numerous ethical issues that have gained
prominence over the last decades (e.g., Kunkel 1984; Fraser 2001; Beekman 2008).
A list of this mosaic of concerns would include: the supply of healthy and safe food
of quality and taste; labor conditions and income of farmers and farm workers; rural
livelihoods and regional economy; the wellbeing of farm animals; environmental
conditions of water, soil, air, as well as effects on climate change and the health of
local inhabitants; effects on nature and biodiversity; the depletion and efficient use
of resources; aesthetic and cultural value of landscapes; concerns of global justice,
food security and fair trade; and the accessibility or traceability of agricultural
production to the public. One salient feature of this list is the sheer diversity of types
of concerns that are involved. Furthermore, for each period in time, for each country
or even region, and for each agricultural sub-sector, the formulation and perceived
significance of these concerns will be different (cf. Jensen and Sørensen 1999).
Whether they feature as societal problems, market externalities, or are taken up as
the multiple aims of agricultural practice, deliberations on their meanings are
situated in distinct arenas. What is fairly universal though, is that increasingly these
issues are moved from the sphere of farmer discretion to that of public policy and
market choice (cf. Rollin 1995; Meijboom 2009). Many of these concerns, such as
animal welfare and environmental degradation, have developed into separate policy
fields and accompanying scientific disciplines. Ethical analysis and theorizing
regarding these fields has developed as well, offering a variety of ‘‘sources’’ of
values, and arguments on the types and severity of the obligations these entail. At
the same time though, these issues can be considered to be in many ways
interrelated (e.g., Korthals 2001; McGlone 2001; Appleby 2005; Constance 2009);
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which makes more encompassing perspectives on the practical ways of dealing with
the mosaic worthwhile to explore.
Farmer Ethics
The perspective from ‘‘practice,’’ of farmers themselves, has remained rather mute in
public discussions. Apart from occasional fierce outcries and forceful lobbying to
further their perceived interests, little debate has emerged on the visions of farmers
regarding the public concerns situated on their fields and in their barns. Nor are they
easily considered to have a (collective) professional ethics (Meijboom 2009).
Sociological studies of (types of) farmers have yielded a diversity of coherent and
internally rational farming styles (Van der Ploeg 1999). This typology can be extended
and linked with categorizations in terms of value orientations, or fundamental moral
attitudes (Cohen et al. 2009). In this paper this kind of systematic categorization of
types of farmers and their ethical stances is not the aim. Even though these labels may
be found to explain positions of farmers regarding ethical debates, they also may
function as shortcuts to actually having to speak and listen to them. Rather the goal
here is to explore the forms that ethical considerations take in farmer decision making,
and the ways in which ethical concerns feature in a variety of farmers’ practices and
discourses. By elaborating concepts to interpret the breadth of moral experiences of
contemporary (Dutch) livestock farmers, the aim is to enliven ethical debates on their
practices, and to make their considerations amenable for critical public discussion in
terms that are meaningful to them. Several characteristics of the way farmers
encounter concerns depart from contemporary societal ways of dealing with ethical
issues. This makes that the ethics professed by farmers is at odds with the modern
moral landscape. By increasing the understanding of contemporary farm life among
policy makers and the general public, room could be created for farmers to more
actively and sophisticatedly join debates on environmental concerns, nature
conservation, animal welfare, and (even) the global impacts of livestock farming.
With an appreciation of their publicly debated ‘‘ethical room for manoeuvre’’ (cf.
Korthals 2008) we could move away from the adversarial and entrenched oppositions
that often characterize these discussions (Fraser 2001), if they take place at all.
Outline
In the next section, three ways of approaching the mosaic of ethical concerns are
distinguished: principlist ethical theories, technological optimization, and a
pragmatist and ethnographic approach to ethics. In section three, some theoretical
backgrounds to this last approach will be elaborated, and the way situations were
sought to study ethnographically the discourse and practices of farmers will be
explained. Section four describes the peculiar nature of farming practices vis-a`-vis
common modes of ethical theorizing. To systematically chart the mixture of moral
motives in the practice of farmers, in section five a sociological model
distinguishing justificatory regimes is explained, and used to interpret the fieldwork.
After this, in a short intermezzo, the farmer’s approach of concrete ethical issues is
illustrated by an example from dairy farming: dehorning cows. Finally, some
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implications of this understanding of farmers’ ethics to the analysis of ethical
concerns and public deliberation are discussed.
Three Approaches to the Mosaic of Concerns
There is a variety of ways in which the ethical concerns in livestock farming could
be understood and dealt with. Here, three kinds of approaches to farming issues are
distinguished.
Principlist Ethics
Most classical ethical theories that are applied to discuss animal farming are
attempts to reduce issues to a single moral principle, usually either the pleasure and
suffering of (human and animal) sentient beings, in utilitarianism, or respect for
living subjects, in rights theories. Pluralist approaches to dealing with ethical
concerns acknowledge the importance of multiple principles, most commonly:
beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice. This type of analysis, which
originated in medical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 1994), has been adapted to
fit the needs of analysis of issues in animal husbandry (Mepham 2000). The
advantage of this approach is that there is room to systematize the complexity of
concerns and formulate ‘‘dilemmas’’ in dealing with these. The mosaic of concerns
can then be taken to be the site of tragic choices, for instance between consumer
autonomy and animal well-being, or as trade-offs between farmer safety and the
intrinsic values of animals. These conflicting concerns in this pluralist approach can
be charted in terms of non-reducible principles. However, these principles by
themselves provide no definite way to decide on them.1 If applying ethical theories
in itself then is not enough to ‘‘solve problems,’’ the question arises whether
principles derived from theories are the best, and only, searchlight for getting at the
complexities of moral choices. Furthermore, a focus on ethical dilemmas could run
the danger of turning dynamic innovation and regulatory processes into static
situations for moral appraisal; thus reifying existing practices instead of opening up
possibilities for creatively developing win–win situations.
Technological Optimization
A second approach does not consider the mosaic of concerns to be a terrain for ethical
debate, but rather for scientific research and technological innovation (cf. Rollin
1995; Fraser 1999). The mosaic here is taken as a list of variables to be optimized in
complex systems. An extreme example of this approach can be found in proposals to
create integrated ‘‘agro-production parks’’ in which, within a closed ‘‘industrial
ecology,’’ large scale pig breeding and fattening could be combined with biogas
1 Even though ethical analysis in terms of principles can be instrumental in broadening the
understandings of ethical concerns in societal debates. Especially when apending principled ethical
theories with participatory approaches, these can provide ways to guide decision making on societal
issues (e.g., Kaiser and Forsberg 2001).
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production and fish breeding (e.g., De Wilt et al. 2000). The benefits of the projected
huge scale of this type of facility, preferably situated in a sea port, would be utilized to
reduce emissions and increase the amount of space per animal. And a slaughterhouse
within the facility would preclude the need for transporting live animals. This
proposal, though potentially offering a solution to a number of pressing issues of
animal welfare and environmental emissions, did overlook concerns that could have
come up in the principled ethical approaches; for one thing the parks may mean a
stark decline of ‘‘farmer autonomy’’ (cf. Driessen 2007). This type of schemes (in
public media in the Netherlands labeled ‘‘pig towers’’ [‘‘varkensflats’’]), that focus on
large scale forms of innovation in dealing with these issues, have been shown to give
rise to severe public resistance and lack of trust (e.g., Hoes et al. 2008). Meanwhile,
taking the mosaic of concerns as mainly a technological challenge for producing win–
win situations can be misleading and short sighted, as ethical choices on priorities and
ideals would still be part of the process.
Ethics by Engagement in Practice
The two modes of dealing with the mosaic of concerns sketched so far have in
common that the issues are addressed as if they require an understanding from a
single vantage point. Whether it is by means of ethical analysis and public
deliberation, or scientific research, engineering, and design, the ethical decision
(-making process) is implicitly thought of as centralized and generic. Even then, the
perspective of farmers, who in their daily practices somehow try to integrate (or
circumvent) the mosaic of moral demands, can be relevant. For instance by
providing an insight into the practicality and feasibility of the ethical solutions
(Birnbacher 1999).
An alternative approach to ethical concerns is one in which the empirical research is
not merely part of an effort to solve ethical puzzles that are basically considered to be
those of an altruistic and all-knowing collective agent. That alternative would be a
conception of ethical thinking that considers the world as populated with a variety of
moral actors.2 This approach is more likely to help motivate farmers to be ‘‘ethical,’’
by granting the opportunity to develop and follow their own rationality. Instead of
forcing a choice between solving principled dilemmas or searching for technical win–
win solutions, the focus on practice means publicly engaging in a continuous
combination of deliberative trade-off and experimental learning.3
2 This means not a mere focus on the autonomy side of the pluralist ethical approach. In farmers’
decisions and in public deliberations the full spectrum of ethical principles in some form can come to the
fore.
3 There have been numerous research projects to design sustainable farming systems that actively involve
farmers (e.g., Bos 2008). And agricultural research, especially within the organic sector, has a tradition of
studying issues in collaboration with farmers, and to include their viewpoints and experiences (e.g.,
Waiblinger et al. 2000). Also farmers themselves have set-up local initiatives for technological and
institutional ways of dealing with a variety of concerns (e.g., Eshuis and Stuiver 2005). But these are
mostly not explicitly understood as involving ethical choices and trade-offs. The third approach here is
not meant in opposition to these efforts, but to highlight ways of actively dealing with ethical concerns
within them. While the general thrust of public debate and policy making with regard to these issues is
aimed towards generic regulations and top-down decision making.
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Not all ethical concerns are best dealt with by merely granting an ethical
‘‘license’’ to the farmer to do as he or she pleases. Sometimes strict governmental
regulations or market standards are required to help farmers to remain competitive
while improving their practices, or to make them reconsider ingrained practices that
have come under scrutiny. But farmers can agree on this, and discussing their
practices in terms of an ethics that is sensitive to the changing character of systems
and norms would contribute to an increased reflexivity on the farm.
Researching Ethics by Doing Fieldwork
Ethics and Ethnography
Apart from prudential reasons to involve those in the field in ethical debates,
listening to farmers as an approach to ethics can be argued for because it is
important to retain concepts and search for arguments that do not stray too far from
actual moral experiences and motivations of people. In order to prevent us from
‘‘losing our concepts’’ (Diamond 1988), the role of ethics then is to explore and
develop rich accounts of our moral universe. An understanding of the nature and
role of ethical thinking that is considered to benefit from engaging with practices
can be found within the tradition of pragmatism. There, both knowledge of the
world, and an ethical stance in it, are considered to result from active experience,
since people are always embedded in a particular environment (Light and Katz
1996). Ethics therefore is to be found in culture, which is not to be understood as an
‘‘add-on’’ to material reality, but as constitutive to understanding, in which the
symbolic and the material are integrated (Geertz 2000). With personal experience
and the meaning of context as the focus of ethical inquiry, anthropological fieldwork
is an appropriate form of empirical study of ethics. An ethnographic engagement
with practices can help to bring some of the ‘‘messy heterogeneity of being in the
world’’ into ethical discussions (Whatmore 2002). Central distinctions in ethical
thought, such as between nature and culture, and the social and the material, can
then be explored as shifting ground, rather then assumed to be stable and
unproblematic norms to assess farming practices. Especially in our technological
culture, having an eye for the co-evolution processes of material practices and
normative stances is central to developing an ethical understanding of problematic
situations (Keulartz et al. 2002). The aim of fieldwork is then to yield a focus of
ethical analysis not solely concerned with values that are expressed discursively, but
also with material and embodied ways of dealing with ethical concerns that are of a
relational and experiential character. And studying what happens in the field would
grant a view on the ways in which the moral agency of farmers emerges from
material arrangements and the behavior of animals (cf. Higgins 2006). Then, besides
farmers, also animals are not considered as generic moral patients, but through their
individual behavior may play an active part in ethical learning processes.4
4 These include not only the farmed animals, but also wild animals living on farms, such as meadowbirds
and their predators: Many farms participate in schemes to protect nesting meadow birds of endangered
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How to Study Ethics in the Field
Now that it is clear that we need ethnographic accounts of the discourse and
practices of farmers, how to go about studying these? Where, for instance, was the
author during the conversations sketched in the introduction? Interviewing farmers
on their ‘‘ethics’’ proved to be difficult, especially as farmers tend not to see the
advantage for their practice of discussing ethical theories (Driessen 2008). Instead,
for this paper the author has sought and arranged situations in which farmers
explained their practices and justified their choices within farming peer groups. This
was done by participating in a weeklong practical training course for young dairy
farmers, together with a group of agricultural university students; by accompanying
animal science researchers on farm visits; by joining in meetings of dairy farming
networks aimed at dealing with practical concerns; and by arranging excursions to
innovative farmers with mixed groups of vocational and academic students of
agriculture.5 The fieldwork was set up as moving from passive, non-directive,
studying of farmer discourses and practices, to more active forms of presence and
questioning. At these various occasions, the arguments and behavior of farmers and
(farming) students were observed, and preliminary findings and interpretations
discussed with them, asking for further explanation and justification of their views
and practices, while explaining the purpose of researching ‘‘their ethics.’’
Farming as a Matter of Mixed Motives
In what way do the moral understandings of farmers diverge from ethical theorizing,
and what should we look for in the ‘‘ethics of farmers?’’ Where most ethical theories
distinguish self-regarding from other-regarding concerns, while demarcating ethics
as concerned exclusively with the latter, this seems a particularly ill-equipped mode
of thinking about farming. Though in some instances pointing at purely self-
regarding motives has critical force (e.g., when animal welfare is defined purely in
terms of productivity), a more ambiguous type of ethical thinking is required to
Footnote 4 continued
varieties. Volunteers mark the nests of of these birds so farmers can mow around them. However,
predators tend to find out about the meanings of the flags in the field, and use these to find their prey.
Farmers and volunteers have been searching for new ways of indicating nests in order to prevent this.
5 All in all, the number of farmers that were visited, or somehow interacted with, was about fifty, in
various degrees of individual encounters and depth of talks. About the same number of vocational
students (in three weeklong excursions) of different educational levels was spoken to, most of whom had
a farming background, worked on a farm, and planned to take over the parental farm. The study is
confined to Dutch farmers, mostly dairy and pig farmers, with a few poultry (laying hen or broiler)
farmers. The farmers were predominantly male, though many of the farms were of the ‘‘maatschap’’
(partnership) legal format and included an active role for women; about six of the farmers and about
thirteen of the participating students were female. An effort was made to interact with a variety of types of
farmers, though an emphasis was on more ‘‘innovative’’ ones who experiment with new practices and
techniques; Organic (and perhaps somewhat ‘‘eccentric’’) farmers are likely to have been overrepre-
sented. This paper not so much aims to be ‘‘representative’’ of farmers in general, but rather to propose
ways of discussing farm practices that connect to the experiences and outlooks of farmers who are
explicitly reflective and willing to engage in forms of public deliberation.
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connect to the intricate nature of farmers’ motivations, and contributes to the search
for improvements of elements of the mosaic that are not directly offset by losses in
income.
The activities of most farmers are not completely guided by concerns of
efficiency and profit, not even those in highly intensive sectors such as laying hen
and pig farming. In farm visits, these ‘‘mixed motives’’ can be encountered at many
points, for instance in the relations to animals. The morality of their motives is most
salient at moments when farmers diverge from what is economically required. Then
there are clear instances of moral concerns, such as when cows are given expensive
treatments even if production standards would require them to be culled, or a sow is
kept one more round even though she is expected to have become not productive
enough anymore. Here the ethical appears as the irrationalities that stand out from a
perspective of pure economic rationality. And farmers talk of feelings of sadness
when animals die: ‘‘You sometimes do get a bond with a certain cow, and
experience a sense of loss, even mourning, when she dies. I even know of a farming
family that has a picture of their favorite cow framed in their living room. But that
goes a bit far I’d say.’’ Or farmers may exhibit forms of coping behavior, as related
by a sow farmer: ‘‘Sometimes a sow dies a few days before she is due to deliver. It is
not economically sensible to perform a caesarean on a sow, most vets have never
even performed one. But next time a sow dies I’ll go and take a walk, rather than
stay and watch the unborn piglets suffocating in their dying mother.’’ Clearly, the
emotional attachment is more prevalent with animals that live longer and are kept in
smaller numbers—more with dairy cows than fattening pigs or broilers and hens.
But still, in most farmers some of this sensitivity seems to exist. Often this is
explained in terms of reciprocity, of justice towards animals that have produced a
lot, or of a personal relation with an animal that behaved good natured towards the
farmer. But occasionally also just in terms of ‘‘fun’’: ‘‘Sometimes, in the new laying
hen housing, I just go and sit on the floor, and they will come and climb and sit on
top of me.’’
When looking for ethics in farming, the focus thus easily goes to irrational
moments at which farmers do something against their productive interests. These
irrationalities and inefficiencies can be a way for farmers to gain some sympathy, or
even legitimacy, in the eye of the general public, as caring not just for money, but
also for animals, nature, and the environment. But situating the ethics solely in these
exceptions to the productionist rationality implies a portrayal of animal farming as
basically unethical. To grant farmers a serious ethical stance requires an
appreciation of their central aim: the efficient production of food (Thompson
1995). Then, what in the eyes of outsiders appears as a double attitude towards
nature and animals, for farmers is a coherent practice. Even in their bodily way of
approaching animals, this hybrid relation can be seen at work. Cows are stroked at
the same time in a caressing and measuring way. The touch estimating stomach
movement or bone structure can morph into a pat on her back. In this way the ethics
of farmers is performed in their bodily locomotion and interaction with their
animals. The ease of handling a chicken, of picking it up and tucking it gently under
one’s arm, can be accompanied by another swift movement of holding it by its feet,
and proudly, if somewhat reluctantly, indicating the way one could pull the head off
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in a single movement. This ambiguous way of relating to animals might come
across as inconsistent, or even disturbed, especially to someone unfamiliar with the
realities of farm life. This hybridity (or perhaps ‘‘monstrousness’’) of moral relations
to animals is most clear in case of traditional farming practices. Before
modernization took hold, the moral universe of the farmer was—even though
comprised of a complicated set of relations—experienced as self-evidently coherent
(Harbers 2002). But also contemporary farmers mostly do not experience tensions
between say hi-tech machinery and ideals of naturalness, e.g., regarding milking
robots.
Regimes of Justification as a Model to Draw out the Moral Complexity
of Farming Practices
Orders of Worth
In order to appreciate the variety of types of concerns and gain a systematic
understanding of the hybrid perspective of farmer ethics, the mixed motives of
farmers can be portrayed in terms of the ‘‘orders of worth’’ in the framework of
practices of justification as developed by Boltanski and Thevenot (1991). They offer
a model to study the kinds of justifications people produce for their actions, drawing
on both fieldwork (mostly on labor relations in large French organizations) and
classic works of political philosophy.6 They distinguish six types of common
justificatory grammars or regimes: The worth of inspiration, in which value is
derived from creativity, holiness, emotion, and imagination. This is how the
production of art is understood, personal experience is lived through, and visions are
developed in spite of the opinions of others. In the domestic order a normative
grammar is common in which personal relations of trust, kinship, face to face
encounters, self sacrifice, and tradition are valued, and where a sense of place is
important. The regime of renown is all about honor, recognition, the opinion of
others, and public display of success. The civic order comprises a type of arguments
that relate to (some understanding of) a common good, such as in terms of equal
rights, or solidarity. The market regime is coordinated by contracts between
consumers and producers, and is focused on mediating scarce goods. Appreciated
are entrepreneurs that seize the opportunities offered by the market. In the industrial
world, worth is based on efficiency in the production of material goods. Professional
capabilities of experts are valued, their organizational planning and investing to
increase productivity.
6 With this model for empirical research, convention theory offers a way to take seriously the agency and
justifications of actors, while also allowing for the existence of (performed) forms of universality.
Thereby creating a middle ground of conceiving agency, between technological or structural determinism
and ideal autonomous ethical agents.
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All these domains can be a resource for actors to make (generalizing) claims, to
debate public issues, and to evaluate situations, persons, or objects, by interpreting
their relevant aspects.7 Disputes in practice can arise over the legitimate criteria to
judge an action or a situation, as humans have the capacity to criticize the type of
arguments produced by others in a specific situation.8
These six modes of evaluation are not to be understood as the full range of
possible justificatory logics. For instance a ‘‘green’’ order of worth was later added,
describing the type of arguments found in discussions over environmental concerns.
And cultural differences may exist in the meanings of orders and their relative
importance (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999; Lamont and Thevenot 2000).9
A number of authors have applied the orders of worth to study struggles and
debates within agriculture (e.g., Marsden et al. 1996; Busch 2000). The framework
can be used to describe differences and strengthen oppositions: between organic and
commercial; between high tech and traditional; between bulk production and
quality; and between commercial and idealist organic farmers. Rosin and Campbell
(2009: 40) point at the complex ways in which contradictory justifications are
negotiated and combined in the development of organic agriculture. In this paper,
the orders are used not to differentiate farmers, but to explore the intricate ways that
various norms operate in farming practices.
Farming in Multiple Orders of Worth
Of course productivity is one of the central values of farming, often valued for itself
(industrial), or in connection with producing abundant and affordable food for
humanity (civic). Farm animals such as cows and pigs are valued for being efficient,
and practical farm choices are mostly described as ‘‘management’’ by farmers and
others in the sector. Thereby farm practices are positioned squarely in the industrial
7 As an example of how arguments on an issue can be drawn from these various orders, one could focus
on our ethical concerns over animals: Farmers could be convinced to improve the treatment of their
animals in order to raise their productivity and lower costs (industrial), or they could be motivated to do
so as a business opportunity, by gaining a higher price for welfare labeled products (market). We may be
inclined to want to treat animals humanely based on experiences of caring for our pets and having
personal relations with animals (domestic), or due to celebrities that campaign for the ethical treatment of
animals (renown). We may as well be convinced by activist groups arguing for the institutionalization of
animal rights (civic), or we may have had a life changing experience after encountering in the wild a
whale, dolphin, elephant, or another ‘‘honorary primate,’’ or hold a religious conviction that requires
reverence or duties towards animals (inspired).
8 Not always do people engage in justificatory explanations for what they do; some societal processes are
contingent, sometimes people make private arrangements outside of these orders, or various forms of
power are exercised without justification.
9 The orders can be understood in a variety of ways. When taken as a model for studying controversies,
the orders form a ‘‘moral geography’’ in which the types of arguments can be charted that play a role in
practices and conflict resolution. Or it can be used as a framework for developing critical arguments
internal or external to an order. When the types of justifications are taken to be incommensurable
normative paradigms, the model can even function as an approach to resolve issues, through determining
the appropriate order for each situation. Used in that way it would resemble the theory of spheres of
justice of Michael Walzer (1983). There the different domains correspond with institutions, such as
political, market, love, and religious institutions, which are each organized according a single societal
principle. (cf. Lamont and Thevenot 2000: 6).
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order. Sustainability can also be understood partly within this order, as the resource
efficient production of food.
The market order is also central to the understanding of farming, while getting an
adequate price for the produce is a prerequisite to continue farming. Nevertheless,
markets for agricultural products are notorious for not being ‘‘true markets,’’ for
being highly regulated, organized, monopolized, and subsidized. ‘‘Money is a
necessary evil; if you want to become rich you should not become a farmer; all the
money we make we use to invest, or to pay off bank loans.’’ Farmers nevertheless
may operate as entrepreneurs, also in seeing the market value of other elements of
the mosaic, such as ‘‘green services’’ for nature conservation that are paid for by the
government.
Farming practices are also situated in the domestic realm. It is common among
e.g., dairy farmers to ask ‘‘how many cows do you have at home?’’ when discussing
someone’s farm, as they predominantly still live next to their production facilities.
And in the architecture, also of comparatively large stalls, an effort is made to create
an ensemble that conveys a rural image and connects to regional architectural
traditions. In a discussion the author had with farming students, these contested the
use of the (in their experience derogatory) term ‘‘industry,’’ even for comparatively
large scale farming operations: ‘‘What does it matter whether a farmer has a
hundred or 300 cows, it is still a farm.’’ ‘‘But what if the farmer no longer lives next
to the production facility?’’ ‘‘Well…, yeah, maybe then it would be industrial.’’
When introducing themselves and their ‘‘business’’ [‘‘bedrijf’’], they typically start
with an account of the family situation. Also the importance of reproduction of
animals, and production of food, allows their practice to be situated not only in the
industrial but also the domestic order. This becomes most clear when the aim of
many farmers is revealed: to continue farming and handing down a viable farm to
the next generation.
Interesting mixtures of justificatory worlds come together in practice. When
farmers mow their fields many will try to avoid hitting birds nests. Not only for the
premium they might get (market), but according to several farmers also motivated
by a concern for rare species (civic), and to avoid the cruel experience of crushing
animals (domestic or inspired). Farmers notice the need for a multiplicity of orders
to increase legitimacy (public as well as private) of their practice. A pig farmer
explained: ‘‘With our new sow-stall with group housing, the children are willing to
enter the barn again, which they refused when we had the confined system.’’ This
made the productive area of the farm part of the household again, and also created
the potential of one of the children to be willing to take over the farm in due time.
Apart from these elements from the domestic realm, the view of (young) children is
taken as of special value within the inspirational regime (Boltanski and Thevenot
1999: 370), creating a renewed sense of legitimacy of the farming practice in that
respect.
Pig farmers are often keen to explain the variety of origins of the feedstuff they
manage to gather, while this type of legitimation of pig farming as efficient and
sustainable has become problematic due to the issue of hygiene and food borne
diseases (cf. Law and Mol 2008). ‘‘Feeding wet mash feed is a challenge, in terms of
economic margins and for optimizing the feed, keeping the pigs healthy, and
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maintaining the taste and quality of the feed. We often use side-products from the
human food sector; it is not waste disposal, but it serves to solve a problem; Last
year, we received 2500 tons of bread from the Ruhr area, in batches of 50 tons fresh
from the previous day. My wife and I, standing in the kitchen, at times found this
mountain of bread in the courtyard a troublesome sight. While elsewhere in the
world people are starving, here we throw away bread that is still good to eat.’’ It
might very well have been the domestic nature of the shared view from the kitchen
that brings this moral perspective home to the farmer (civic, through domestic). The
processing of waste-flows in a more industrial setting is likely to be considered far
more ‘‘normal,’’ when compared to the bread that is clearly out of place in their
backyard. At the same time the farmer is proud of, or at least content with, how he
manages to keep feed costs low, offer a varied diet to his pigs, and works to recycle
waste flows from the food industry and thereby adds value (industrial and market).
One could ask why we should bother that farmers also can somewhat love their
animals and care for their land; how it matters that farmers have ethical sensitivities
beyond their immediate tasks. But the practical nature of farm activities makes their
ethical views relevant to changes in practices. Especially the more entrepreneurial
farmers can exhibit a form of ethical agency by creating new ways of dealing with
societal concerns. One example would be the investment in alternative modes of
energy production by erecting windmills or biomass installations. These initiatives
are ways of expressing ethical commitments that can be situated both in market
(entrepreneurial), civic (common good), and industrial (efficiency) orders. Of course
these initiatives are often taken as part of wider subsidy schemes and market
arrangements. But rather than situating all important ethical developments on the
policy level, some of the moral agency could very well be located at farm level
initiatives (cf. Roep et al. 2003).
A number of both organic and non-organic (whether conventional, or self-
proclaimed ‘‘in between’’ or even ‘‘beyond organic’’) farmers stated that organic is
‘‘also merely another set of rules.’’ By thus creating an external position to the
organic standards, they created ‘‘room’’ for professional autonomy, a knowledge-
able position from which to develop a farming practice that is rational in their eyes
without slavishly following (external) rules that in some situations can be viewed as
irrational and overly, or too little, stringent. Thus these farmers create a way of
affirming their more ‘‘rational’’ (industrial) outlook but also a more lived-through
farming ethic they developed by themselves, connecting to the inspired order of
authenticity and creativity.
The Moral Landscape of Farming vs. Compartmentalized Ethics
Farmers experience their mixed motives and the variety of moral orders mostly not
as a hybrid; their practices appear as such only within and when compared to
functionally specialized and morally differentiated institutions. When in the theory
of Boltanski and Thevenot the orders of justification are considered basically
incompatible, farming appears as an ethical chaos. The central issue for
understanding the moral landscape of farming is then whether the orders can be
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legitimately ‘‘mixed’’ in a single practice, rather than merely cohabit in uneasy
compromise.
In our modernized and functionally differentiated society, these orders tend to
become separated and roles and relations specialized and purified.10 As localized
activities, these moral orders are even spatially planned, thereby institutionalizing
and effectively constructing a zoning of types of appropriate normative arguments
and possible relations between humans and between humans and animals.11 Areas
are designated for (industrial) production, for (inspiring) nature and recreation, or
for (domestic) habitation. This type of ethical thinking that resists ambiguity is
exemplified by the design of the pig tower and responses to it: as a reaction to the
proposal unwittingly a coalition emerged of those that felt that ‘‘pigs should be on a
farm’’ and others that claimed ‘‘pigs don’t belong in a factory.’’ Concrete plans for
large scale pig farms more recently though met fierce resistance from local
inhabitants, stating ‘‘this belongs in an industrial zone.’’ With the industrialization
of agriculture, the ethical issue comes down to sorting out where an activity belongs
in our discretely zoned moral landscape.
When assessed from each single moral order, current practices seem deficient and
suboptimal. Most farmers are not fully entrepreneurs, nor are they the best
imaginable nature managers. Much of contemporary farming in the Netherlands still
is a peculiar amalgam of modernity and tradition, of material production at home, of
hi-tech efficiency and relations of care (cf. Meijboom 2009). With farming
understood and arranged as a focal practice in which these various aspects are
combined, productive work can be an adequate response to place (Thompson 2000),
rather than a NIMBY activity in search for a wasteland. For this an intricate
combination of modes of critique would be required to appreciate dealing with
farming concerns.
10 Of course there are a variety of other institutions where a mixture of orders of worth are necessary to
understand their meaning and practices; think only of the (ideal of the) university, which comprises
industrial (producing knowledge workers), market (adding value, spin offs of research), inspired
(creativity, self actualization), domestic (campus, modeling teacher student relations on patriarchal, or
matriarchal, ideals), and civic (educating autonomous and responsible citizens, doing research for the
betterment of humanity) orders of worth. But here as well it can be argued that industrial (output
measurements) and market norms (increasing numbers of students and tuition fees, and meeting the
market demands for workers) are increasingly dominant.
11 Regarding the orders of worth and our dealing with animals it is clear that our motives and
justifications for certain treatments of animals are varied, but also that in modern society there is a
tendency to separate these understandings of animals over different human animal relations and societal
domains. Animal practices and the attending relations and meanings can then legitimately only be of one
kind, and farming is no longer one of these ‘‘singular’’ practices (cf. Korthals 2001; Harbers 2002).
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An illustration of ethical decision making as practical engagement: cow horns
Should cows have horns, or is it permissible to dehorn them? That is the type of question an
agricultural ethicist might try to answer, and that would be prone to become subject of governmental
regulation. (And it is a good example of a complex, multi-factorial issue that is best studied by
involving the views and experiences of farmers, as there have been some efforts in the past
(Waiblinger et al. 2000; Baars and Buitink 1995).) The issue could be considered to be a
technological challenge: of a method for painlessly dehorning, of designing housing that is suitable
for horned animals, or of breeding cows without horns. Alternatively, one could argue dehorning to
be a case to be decided in the ethical terms of ‘‘bodily integrity’’ of the cow, dismissing this
mutilation of the animal based on her (civic) right, or perhaps (inspirational) essence. But when taken
up solely from these angles, several aspects would not be discussed. On a farm visit with agricultural
students, a farmer explained: ‘‘Cows with horns offer little trouble, as long as the housing is in order.
With our large round and open housing, the weakest animal in the herd can flee; in loose (box)
housing you sometimes see that an animal can be totally butted to pieces [helemaal kapotgestoten].
Then you’ll see blood in the milk from the fighting; this we see only a few times a year.’’ There is
some grumbling talk among the attending farming students. ‘‘Why do you want to have horns?’’ ‘‘We
do not believe horns are ‘‘antennas to the cosmos’’ or anything like that. But we do believe that horns
play a role in their digestion system, that it improves their health. And look, we think it’s beautiful.’’
When the tour moves into the field, the cows come walking towards the large group of visitors and
mingle with them. ‘‘You see these cows are clearly not afraid, but curious. When they see people they
come and take a look.’’ The students start goofing around with the cows, playfully trying to catch
their horns. But most feel retaining the horns at their own farms to be too dangerous, to the farmer
and to the other cows. Whether the housing is adequate to prevent horned cows hurting each other
depends on the skills of the farmer, but is also a matter of accepting some level of mutual damaging
of cows (cf. Baars and Buitink 1995), whether in terms of loss of productivity (industrial) or as a
relation of responsibility and care of the farmer for individual cows (domestic). Decisions on
dehorning include numerous choices: for a type of behavior and character of the cows and a certain
kind of herd, a type of human-animal relation (as domestic patriarchal, or inspired and respectful), an
estimation of the risk to the farmer, an aesthetic appreciation. These interconnected choices farming
abounds with are not easily decided outside of the particular situations in which farmers find
themselves, and the multiple orders from which to evaluate their practice, as they ultimately come
down to the question of what kind of farmer to be.
Implications of the Sketch of Farmer Ethics for Deliberations on Sustainability
Public Debate Infused by Farmer Experiences
What do the ways in which farmers experience and express the ethical aspects of
their practice mean for debates on sustainable agriculture? The descriptions of
farmer motives in terms of orders of worth revealed implicit positions on the types
of moral arguments that can or should be part of public deliberation. When farmers
and their views are not obviously included in these debates, or if the ability of
farmers to take part in ethical debates is questioned, a choice is already made on
whose terms these debates are to be performed, and what constitutes legitimate
arguments and a meaningful debate. Recognition of the peculiarly entangled nature
of the ethics of farming practices could counter the tendency in policy making,
technological innovation, and ethical thought to compartmentalize our moral
landscape. Understanding farming practice as the integration of the mosaic of
concerns in the light of a wide variety of moral experiences would foster public
appreciation of the mixed motives of farmers. Rather than try to fit them into the
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mould of ethical theory that purifies self-regarding from other-regarding motives
and situates all meaningful ethical concerns in the latter. With the ‘‘selves’’ of the
farmers and their families considered as part of the meaningful context of local
practices, ethical debates would include a variety of experiences and considerations,
and include embodied ways of interacting with animals, food, agricultural nature,
and the environment. Then it is clear that the mosaic of concerns requires ethical
responses from a variety of orders of worth, and that the mixed motives of farmers
offer a relevant outlook on this mosaic.
Ethics as Reflexivity in Practice
The envisioned outcome of deliberations does not need to be a single generic
conclusion, a collective decision on what is the right way to practice sustainable
agriculture. The variety in circumstances and skills of farmers can be taken as
legitimating a diversity of ways to integrate the mosaic of ethical concerns they
grapple with (cf. Kupper and De Cock Buning 2010). The case of dealing with horns
illustrates that for instance defining animal welfare is not necessarily best
completely relegated to a centralized policy making process, based solely on
scientific expertise and abstract reductionist ethical analysis. Farmers in practice can
use the variety of motives and concerns to creatively and reflexively learn to
develop a system in which issues are dealt with. This could be considered an
argument in favor of institutional and regulatory reform so as to create more
‘‘ethical room for manoeuvre’’ (Korthals 2008), creating incentives for farmers to
pursue and discuss their own strategies. Farmers are mostly able to explain their
particular choices and arrangements, and by engaging in public discussions find
occasion to further reflect on these. The task of the public would then be to critically
follow their endeavors; with professional ethicists interpreting and developing the
concepts to reflect on the collective experimental learning processes. This might
mean that things will not always be optimized and rationally weighed in terms of
stakeholders and values by policy makers and ethics committees. But allowing a
space for farmers as moral subjects, acting from their own rationalities and skills in
interaction with their products, land, and animals, will make conversations with
them more interesting. Farmers meanwhile will need to show to the public why it
should want to prevent their disappearance as (independent) moral subjects, gain a
critical perspective on existing practices and technologies, and open up their local
and contextual learning processes for public deliberation.
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